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2Abstract
This study analyses the effect of public sector sponsored continuous vocational training and
retraining in East Germany after unification with West Germany in 1990. It presents estimates
of the average gains from training participation in terms of earnings, employment probabilities
and career prospects after the completion of training. The data is from the German Socio-Eco-
nomic Panel (GSOEP, 1990-1994). The GSOEP allows to observe individual behaviour on a
monthly, respectively yearly, basis. The results suggest that despite public expenditures of
more than DM 25 bn (1991 to 1993), there are no positive effects in the first year after train-
ing, but that participants expect positive effects over a longer time horizon. The latter however
is beyond the sampling period.
Keywords
Evaluation of training programs, causal analysis, panel data, matching on the propensity score,
East German labour markets.
JEL classification: J24, J31, J60, C33
31 Introduction
Unification of the East and West German economies in July 1990 - Economic, Social and
Monetary Union - came as a shock to the formerly centrally planned East German economy.
The almost immediate imposition of the West German type of market economy with all its
distinctive institutional features and its relative prices led to dramatic imbalances on all mar-
kets. For example the official unemployment rose from about 2% in the GDR to more than
15% in 1992. It remained on that high level for the following years. To avoid higher un-
employment as well as to adjust the stock of human capital to the new demand structure the
state conducted an active labour market policy. The evaluation of the continuous vocational
training and retraining part of that policy is the focus of this paper. Since more than DM 25 bn
are devoted to this purpose until the end of 1993, the need for an evaluation is obvious. This
paper presents estimates of the average individual gains to the workers of the former GDR
participating in such training beginning between July 1990 and December 1992. The targets of
the evaluations are labour market outcomes after the completion of the training, such as
earnings, labour market status, and career prospects.
In typical microeconometric evaluations of training programs, outcomes measured for the
sample undergoing the training are compared to outcome measures for a comparable group,
called control group, that does not get the training. In most social experiments such a group
consists of individuals who apply for the program, but are denied participation by randomi-
sation, for instance. Hence, such a control group should not systematically differ from the
trainees. This simplifies the evaluation dramatically, because the difference of simple sample
means in the trainee and the control population is an unbiased and consistent estimator for the
average effect of training for the trainees. However, the huge time lag between the beginning
of such an experiment and the results of the evaluations is one reason why conducting an ex-
periment was never an option in East Germany.1 In a study not based on experimental data the
researcher should find individuals who are identical to trainees regarding all relevant pre-
training attributes except for not having obtained the training. Since typically such individuals
cannot be easily identified, additional assumptions have to be invoked to adjust for their dis-
similarity to avoid potentially serious sample selection biases. Holland (1986) and Heckman
and Hotz (1989) provide extensive and excellent discussions on these issues.
Various model-based procedures are suggested in the econometrics’ literature to avoid such
biases (see for example Heckman and Hotz, 1989, or Heckman and Robb, 1985).2 However,
Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and LaLonde (1986) - among others - conclude that the results
are highly sensitive to the different stochastic assumptions made about the selection process.
Both papers conclude that the econometric adjustment procedures are unreliable, and hence
                                                          
1
 The state of the discussion about whether it is advantageous or not to base evaluations on social experiments
can be found in Burtless (1995) and Heckman and Smith (1995a).
2 Chapter 1 in Bell, Orr, Blomquist, and Cain (1995) provides a more complete account of the development of
the econometric evaluation literature.
4that social experiments are necessary to evaluate training programs. On the other hand, as
Heckman and Hotz (1989) correctly observe, the only case you expect adjustment procedures
based on different assumptions about the source of the sample selection bias to lead to the
same results, is the very case when there is no bias. Consequently, these authors suggest test
procedures to chose methods suitable for the particular problem analysed. Recently, Dehejia
and Wahba (1995a, 1995b) - using an approach very similar to the one chosen here - re-
evaluate the LaLonde (1986) data. By using nonparametric techniques - partly to be discussed
later - they come to far more positive conclusions about the potential quality of inferences
based on observational data than LaLonde (1986) himself. This issue is not yet settled.
Many problems with the statistical modelling procedures stem from the fact that the data does
not provide sufficient information on all important factors that influence program participation
as well as labour market outcomes. Then it is necessary to introduce unobserved ´error terms´
and to model their joint distribution with the variables of the model. It is one of the major
advantages of the data used in the empirical analysis in this paper that it is a highly in-
formative panel data set. This data set is a random sample from the East German population
and hence contains both trainees and non-trainees. It contains many socio-economic variables
and allows for example to track down employment histories on a monthly basis beginning
twelve months prior to the economic union. Therefore, I do not need to introduce error terms
and I can concentrate on controlling for observable difference of trainees and controls. Since
this is done nonparametricly by extending the methods proposed by Rubin (1979) and Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1983, 1985a), the results should be reasonably immune to the above criti-
cisms.
Although, there is a large number of evaluation results for US-training programs available
(e.g. LaLonde, 1995), there are only very few econometric evaluations of training in East
Germany. The results in this paper do not confirm previous positive findings of the effective-
ness of training in East Germany (e.g. Fitzenberger and Prey, 1995, 1996, Pannenberg and
Helberger, 1994, Pannenberg, 1995). Although there are only few studies conducted so far,
they differ in many respects ranging from the database to the implementation of the evalua-
tion, treatment of the selection problems, and the definition of the training itself. However,
they share two common features that are absent from this work: They do not use an explicit
causality framework, and they are based on modelling the distributions of the outcome vari-
ables or error terms given certain covariates. In a very similar way as the companion paper
Lechner (1995a), this paper explicitly avoids imposing such restrictions and puts emphasis of
the particular notion of causality behind the results. However, Lechner (1995a) investigates a
different sort of training based on a different kind of data. That paper focuses on off-the-job
training excluding retraining but including many short spells of training not publicly subsi-
dised. In contrast to the mentioned papers, this study here focuses exclusively on public sector
sponsored training. Hence it can be used as one piece of evidence to answer the question
whether the huge amount of public money has been spent wisely.
5The paper contributes to the ongoing discussion of the effectiveness of the training in East
Germany by analysing the participation decision as well as by identifying empirically im-
portant factors related to it, before obtaining evaluation results for several outcome measures
related to the actual and prospective individual position in the labour market. The findings
suggest that in the short run public sector sponsored training has a negative impact, because it
reduces the job search efforts for the trainees during training as compared to a comparable
spell of unemployment. However, several months after the end of the training there are no
statistically significant differences between the controls and the trainees. Hence, training has
no positive effect on the trainees’ labour market outcomes. However, there is some evidence
that trainees expect positive returns over a longer time horizon that however is beyond the
sampling period available for this analysis. If these expectations materialise, then future
evaluations will find a positive effect of training.
The paper is organised as follows: The next section outlines basic features of the East German
labour markets after unification. It includes a brief discussion of the training part of the active
labour market policy. Section 3 introduces the longitudinal data used in this study and pres-
ents several characteristics of the sample chosen. Issues related to the econometric methodol-
ogy and the empirical implementation are discussed in the four subsections of Section 4. The
first subsection details the causality framework used and discusses general conditions for the
identification of average causal effects. The following two subsections identify factors influ-
encing (potential) labour market outcomes as well as training participation and show that
shocks, such as the occurrence of unemployment, play a very important role for the participa-
tion probability. An adaptation of the matching approach is suggested. It allows for these fac-
tors to be included in the choice of the control population. The final subsection defines the
outcomes, gives details of the suggested nonparametric estimation approach, and shows sev-
eral aspects of the results. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains additional information
about the data used. Appendix B consists of several more technical parts concerning the
econometric methods. Appendix C presents the detailed results of the estimation as well as
specification tests for the estimation of the (partial) participation probabilities. Appendix D
shows some details about the differences between the training population and several potential
control populations. Finally, Appendix E contains additional evaluation results.
2 East German labour markets in transition
The Economic, Monetary, and Social Union in July 1990 (EMSU) came as a shock to the
formerly centrally planned East German economy. The almost immediate imposition of the
West German type of market economy with all its distinctive institutional features and its
relative prices led to a large drop of the GDP in 1990. After that drop the GDP grew by about
66-8% p.a. in the period 1991 to 1994.3 In the same period average earnings per worker in-
creased from about 48% of the West German level in 1991 to about 73% of that level. How-
ever, labour productivity increased only from about 31% to about 51%. As a result there were
severe disequilibria in the labour market. The labour force dropped by about 2 million people
from 8.3 million in the second half of 1990 to 6.3 million in 1992. It remained approximately
stable afterwards. Similarly, (official) unemployment rose from about 2% in the GDR to more
than 15% in 1992. It remained on that high level for the following two years. To avoid higher
unemployment, among other objectives, the state conducted an active labour market policy.
The evaluation of the continuous vocational training and retraining part (CTRT) of that policy
is the focus of this paper.
Figure 1 shows monthly pre- and post- unification developments for various indicators, such
as unemployment, publicly funded short-time work (STW, "Kurzarbeit") and the proportion of
those individuals not in full-time employment. The figure describes the population that I am
most interested in: individuals not younger than 20 and not older than 50 in 1990. They
worked full-time just before unification, lived in East Germany at least until 1993, and are not
in bad health conditions. These individuals constitute the active labour force of the late GDR,
and they are too young to consider (regular) retirement in the next years after unification.
Figure 1: Labour market states and public sector sponsored training and retraining (CTRT)
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3 The data used in this section is based - unless indicated otherwise - on information contained in Statistisches
Bundesamt (1994), DIW (1994), Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (1994a, 1994b), Bundesministerium für Bildung
und Wissenschaft (1994), Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (1995), and Bundesminister für Arbeit und
Sozialordnung (1991).
7Figure 1 shows that for this population full-time employment (100 minus share not full-time-
employed; denoted by a line with x´s) declines from 100% in mid 1990 to about 72% in early
1991 and than stabilises at around 80%.4 A very significant proportion of the early fall is ab-
sorbed into STW (•), which means a reduction of working hours in the firm accompanied by a
subsidy from the labour office to compensate employees for the otherwise occurring earnings
loss. In particular in the first year after unification this reduction of working hours could be
substantial.5 However, STW was only temporarily an important tool of the active labour mar-
ket policy. It became unimportant after 1991. As a result of the decline of STW after early
1991 as well as of the worsening general labour market conditions, the unemployment rate (+)
increased steadily up to about 12 % in the end of 1993.6 Finally, the number of people taking
part in CTRT (∆) increased steadily after unification and reached its peak in early 1992 with
about 4% of those full-time employed in 1990 and fell thereafter due to policy changes.
To smooth the transition to a market economy and to adjust the East German stock of human
capital to the needs of the new economic system, various levels of the state and its agencies, in
particular the labour offices, conducted an active labour market policy. This policy not only
provided significant funds for training and retraining opportunities (about 26 bn DM until
1993), but also supplied subsidies for STW (14 bn DM) and Public Work Programs (ABM, 26
bn DM). However, a discussion of the latter two policies is beyond the scope of this paper.
Continuous vocational training and vocational retraining for a new profession are subsidised
by the labour office under provisions of the Work Support Act ("Arbeitsförderungsgesetz",
AFG). They form the largest and most important part of the continuous training and retraining
taking place after unification. There are three broad types of training and retraining that are
supported: (i) continuous training to increase skills within the current profession (CT), (ii)
learning a new profession (RT), and (iii) employers are subsidised for a limited period to
provide on-the-job training for individuals facing difficult labour market conditions to allow
them to familiarise themselves with the new job (FJ). The focus of this paper is on the first
and second group, that account for more than 90% of all entries in these subsidised courses.
The share of the third group is small and declining (1991: 14.9%, 1992: 12.8%, 1993: 10.6%,
1994: 6.7%). The major difference between groups (i), (ii) versus (iii)  is that (i) and (ii) are
typically classroom (i.e. off-the-job) training (99%), whereas (iii) is always on-the-job train-
ing.
                                                          
4 The definition of full-time work used here includes Public-Work-Programs (ABM) which account for about 5-
10% of full-time employment. After the decline of STW, it could partly be seen as a substitute for it.
5 In the total population in 1991 (1992, 1993) about 56% (48%, 34%) employees on short time work worked
less than 50%, and 27% (26%, 23%) worked less than 25% of their usual hours.
6 Unemployment, STW, and CTRT numbers are lower than the official rates for the total population, because of
the age restriction and because different definitions of the relevant populations appearing in the denominator
of the ratios. Furthermore, CTRT includes only individuals receiving compensation for potential earnings
losses ("Unterhaltsgeld"). For a precise definition see below.
8When certain conditions are met, the labour office pays for the provision for the training as
well as for the foregone earnings. These conditions are related to the employment history, the
approval of the course by the labour office, and the potential termination of unemployment or
the avoidance of a possibility to become unemployed soon. Until 1993 the last principle has
been applied using a broad interpretation in East Germany, so that it includes more groups of
the labour force than in the West. In most cases the payments cover almost all the costs for the
provision of the course as well as 65% or 73% of the previous net earnings ("Unterhaltsgeld",
UHG). For comparison, this is about 10% higher than unemployment benefits (60% or 67%).
Additionally, until the end of 1991, workers participating in CT during STW obtained a
slightly increased STW compensation. During 1993 and in the beginning of 1994 the rules
have been significantly tightened to make sure that the now reduced budget is more precisely
targeted to those being unemployed. Also from 1994 on, the amount of UHG individuals can
receive is not larger than unemployment benefits. The current analysis is based on recipients
of UHG (including STW with training) who began their training not later than 1992. In the
following, this group is appreviated as CTRT.
Table 1 gives the (official) numbers of entrants into different parts of CTRT and shows the
ratios of previously unemployed participants and the average shares of participants obtaining
UHG from 1991 to 1993. In 1990 they were not important at all. CT is divided in two sub-
groups. The second subgroup covers training with very short duration (some days), which is
no longer supported by the labour office after 1992. In 1991 and 1992 the number of entrants
is very large and close to about 10% of total employment each year. In 1993 the policy
changes led to a significant drop of entrants. Interestingly, the share of rejected applications
for any sort of CTRT subsidy is very low (1991: 1.8%, 1992: 5.5%, 1993: 7.7%). However,
particularly in 1993 many potential applicants may not have applied, because they were
informed before a formal application that they will not qualify.
Table 1: Entries into continuous vocational training (CT) and retraining (RT) 1991 to 1993
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9The share of participants who were unemployed before CTRT increases over time due to the
worsening situation of the labour market as well as the tightening of the admission rules set by
the BA. The share of UHG recipients is above 80% for 1992 and 1993.
The BA is the most important source of finance for CTRT. Table 2 shows the expenditure of
the BA for CTRT from 1991 to 1993 (they were very small in 1990). In 1992 and 1993 more
than 60% of the total expenditure of about DM 10 bn was allocated to direct earnings support
for participants. Most of the remaining share covers direct costs of CTRT, and a small pro-
portion goes as direct support to the providers of the training. Taking together the number of
entries in Table 1 and the expenditures in Table 2 suggests an average cost per entry of about
14.200 DM. However, this is only a lower bound for the true average cost per head, because
several of the CTRT entries will still be in CTRT after 1993.
Table 2: Expenditure of the labour office (BA) for CTRT 1991 to 1993
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For more details about training providers and their financing the reader is referred to Müller
(1994). Buttler (1994) presents more information about the different sources of financing the
active labour market policy in East Germany.
3 Data
The sample used for the empirical analysis is drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP), which is very similar to the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics. About 5000
households are interviewed each year beginning in 1984. A sample of just under 2000 East
German households was added in 1990. The GSOEP is very rich in terms of socio-demo-
graphic information, in particular concerning current and past employment status. The attri-
tion and item nonresponse rates seem to be reasonable low for such a panel study: the attrition
rate for the East German sample (1990-1994) is 26% for households and 29.3% for individu-
als. For a more comprehensive English language description of the GSOEP see Wagner,
Burkhauser and Behringer (1993).
A very useful characteristic of this panel survey is the availability of monthly information
between yearly interviews. This covers different employment states and income categories.
The information is obtained by retrospective questions about what happened in particular
10
months of the previous year. Figure 2 shows a sketch of one type of ’calendar’: the income
calendar.
Figure 2: Selected items of the retrospective questions about income in the 1993
questionnaire (income calendar)
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The related employment calendar contains information on the employment status, such as full
time employment, part time employment, STW, vocational training, schooling, and so on.
These calendars allow a precise observation of the individual employment states and income
sources before and after CTRT. This kind of information will figure prominently in the em-
pirical analysis.
A balanced sample of all individuals born between 1940 and 1970 who responded in in the
first four waves is selected. The upper age limit is set to avoid the need of addressing early
retirement issues. The population of interest is the one that formed the labour force of the
GDR, therefore it is required that all selected individuals work full-time just before
unification. Furthermore, the self-employed in the former GDR (2% of non-CTRT sample),
those individuals working in the GDR in the industrial sectors energy and water (3%), mining
(3%), and health (8%), and persons stating in 1990 that expect certainly improvements in their
professional career in the next two years (2%) are not observed taking part in CTRT, so they
are deleted from the sample (see Table A.1 in Appendix A for details). Additionally,
individuals reporting severe medical conditions are not considered either, because evaluating
the specific kind of training they receive would be beyond the scope of this paper. In order to
be able to control for the entire labour market history before CTRT (beginning in mid 1989) -
necessary to control for the selection issues - it is required that all individuals answer the
relevant survey questions in all four yearly surveys. Since the fifth survey (1994) is only used
to measure post-CTRT labour market outcome, it is not necessary to impose such a
requirement.
The income and employment calendars are used to define the training measure CTRT. Indi-
viduals are considered to participate in CTRT if they receive UHG or obtain continuous voca-
11
tional training during STW. It is required that the training periods starts after unification but
not later than March 1993 to ensure that all CTRT is obtained under the regime valid up to
1992.
The mean (std.) of the durations is about 12 (7). 10% of the CTRT spells have a duration of
no more than 3 months, 25% of no more than 6 months, 65% of no more than 12 months, and
95% of no more than 24 months. Comparing these number with the durations of CT, RT and
FJ (FJ durations are 6 to 12 months) spells as given by the BA, it is found that a substantial
part of short spells is missing from the sample. However, note that not only the comparison is
not really valid because of the inclusion of FJ in the official numbers, but also that there are
other issues related to the questionnaire (calendar): Firstly, the fact that it is retrospective
information about last year may result in participants forgetting very short training spells.
Secondly, it may be that respondents do not bother to tick boxes for a particular month in case
of very short spells of some days. Thirdly, multiple spells are added (10%) which increases
duration per spell. However, by omitting these very short spells that may be related to AFG
§41a (no longer supported by BA after 1992!) the following empirical analysis is more
focused on longer spells that obviously absorb a much larger amount of resources. It is these
longer CTRT spells that are a priori considered to be most effective. More details on the
CTRT spells can be found in Appendix A.
Figure 3: Share of registered unemployed before and after CTRT for CTRT participants in %
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Figure 3 shows CTRT participants that are unemployed in any given number of months before
or after CTRT. There is a dramatic surge in unemployment in 10 months prior to CTRT cul-
minating in an unemployment ratio of about 51% in the month just prior to training. The re-
spective rates for full-time employment are 24% (Figure A.5) and 73% for the combined rate
12
of unemployment or STW (Figure A.6). From these figures it is already clear that CTRT par-
ticipants are not a random sample from the population. This is of course at least with respect
to unemployment history intentional, because CTRT is - at least in principle - targeted to the
unemployment and to those under a general threat of unemployment.
Considering the post-CTRT period, it appears that many CTRT participants find jobs fairly
quickly. Whether they do this fast enough to make up for the time lost for search during
CTRT participation, which is on average twelve months, will be seen below. The BA also
publishes the share of unemployed and for particular points in time the share of unemployed
six months after the end of CTRT. Although an exact comparisons is difficult, because of the
different concepts of time used, their numbers are within the ranges shown in Figure 3 (see
Buttler and Emmerich, 1994, Blaschke and Nagel, 1995, IAB ,1995, p.134).
Figure 4 shows a similar plot for the real earnings variable. Note however that earnings are
measured only at the yearly interview. Due to data availability, the deflator used is the cost-of-
living price index. Hence, the sharp increase of average earnings after CTRT may merely re-
flect the divergence of wage growth and cost of living together with the increasing proportion
of people working after CTRT. The relative flat behaviour of the curve before CTRT should
reflect the increasing unemployment rates together with rapid wage growth. In this figure
earnings for non-workers are coded as unemployment benefits (see Appendix A for details),
but the same shape of the curve emerges when earnings for non-workers are coded as zeros.
Figure 4: Gross earnings (in 1993 DM) before and after CTRT for CTRT participants
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When comparing pre- and post CTRT earnings of the trainees to a randomly chosen group of
individuals not participating in CTRT, Ashenfelter´s (1978) dip in earnings prior to a training
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program appears. This dip is clearly due to the increased proportion of unemployed persons
prior to training (see Figure 3). Heckman and Smith (1995b) noted that when earnings dynam-
ics are largely driven by unemployment dynamics, controlling for lagged earnings is not suf-
ficient to evaluate the impact of CTRT.
Figure 5: Difference of gross earnings (in 1993 DM) before and after CTRT between CTRT
participants and random control group
 #		 		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Considering other socio-economic variables, there does not appear to be a large age differ-
ence, but there are far more women in CTRT than men. Regarding schooling degrees, profes-
sional degrees and job positions in 1990 a very similar pattern appears. Individuals who ac-
cumulated more human capital and who reached a higher job position in the former GDR are
more likely to seek and obtain CTRT. More details on the socio-economic variables can be
found in Table A.1 of Appendix A.
4 Econometric methodology and empirical implementation
The previous section showed that before / after comparison are insufficient to control for the
selectivity problem which is clearly visible in the data. In this section I introduce a notation
which allows to address this problem directly. Section 4.1 begins with a brief discussion of
causal modelling and the restrictions that are used to identify the training effects. Subsection
4.2 shows that this identifying assumption is reasonable for the problem analysed in this study
and the data at hand. Then it discusses the estimation and test framework as well as the results
of the estimation of the probability of CTRT participation. Subsection 4.3 is devoted to spe-
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cific issues related to the chosen nonparametric estimation approach. Finally, subsection 4.4
contains the econometric methods used for and the results of the actual evaluation. Several
technical aspects are relegated to Appendix B and additional results can be found in Appendi-
ces C and D.
4.1 Causality, potential outcomes, identification and balancing scores
The empirical analysis tries to answer questions like "What is the average gain for CTRT par-
ticipants compared to the hypothetical state of nonparticipation?" It refers to potential out-
comes or potential states of the world, which never occur. The underlying notion of causality
requires the researcher to determine whether participation or nonparticipation in CTRT effects
the respective outcomes, such as earnings or employment status. This is very different from
asking whether there is an empirical association, typically related to some kind of correlation,
between CTRT and the outcome. Therefore, I do not try to answer the question whether CTRT
is associated with higher earnings for example, but whether the effect of CTRT is higher
earnings.7
The framework that will serve as guideline for the empirical analysis is the potential-outcome
approach to causality suggested by Rubin (1974). This idea of causality is inspired by the set-
up of experiments in science. Its main building blocks for the notation are units (here: indi-
viduals), for which I will assume that they belong to the large population defined in the pre-
vious section, treatment (participating in CTRT or not participating in CTRT) and potential
outcomes, which are also called responses (earnings, labour market states, either at a particu-
lar time, or at a particular span of time after having completed CTRT). Y t  and Y c  denote the
outcomes (t denotes treatment, c denotes control, i.e. no treatment).8 Additionally, denote vari-
ables that are unaffected by treatments - called attributes by Holland (1986) - by X. Attributes
are exogenous in the sense that their potential values for the different treatment states coincide
(Xt=Xc). It remains to define a binary assignment indicator S, which determines whether unit n
gets the treatment (S = 1) or not (S = 0). If the unit participates in CTRT the actual
(observable) outcome (Y ) is Y t , and Y c , otherwise. This notation points to the fundamental
problem of causal analysis. The causal effect, for example defined as difference of the two
potential outcomes, can never be estimated, even with an infinite sample, because the counter-
factual ( , )y snt n = 0  or ( , )y snc n = 1  to the observable outcome  ( yn )  is never observed.
It is the important contribution of this literature to show under what conditions objects like
average causal effects can be identified from a sample of the population. Furthermore, it is a
helpful device to design ’informative’ social experiments, or - if this is not possible or not de-
                                                          
7 See Holland (1986) and Sobel (1994) for an extensive discussion of concepts of causality in statistics,
econometrics, and other fields.
8 As a notational convention big letters indicate quantities of the population or of members of the population
and small letters denote the respective quantities in the sample. The units of the sample (n=1,...,N) are
supposed to stem from N independent draws in this population.
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sirable - to set up the problem under investigation in such a way that it approximates closely
the design of an experiment, and to point out possible departures. Another advantage of this
approach is that it enforces clear distinctions for three different stages of the empirical analy-
sis: the set-up of the problem using an appropriate notation, the assumptions necessary for the
identification of the quantities of interest, and the final estimation stage. Finally, the potential
outcome approach to causality emphasises the need to explicitly choose a control group and
discuss its characteristics. Ideally, members of this control should be like clones of the mem-
bers of the treatment group. This means that they should be identical in all aspects effecting
the training decision as well as the potential outcomes. If it is not possible to find such indi-
viduals, additional assumptions have to be invoked to - in some sense - adjust for their dis-
similarity.
Using the previous notation, the estimand of interest, which is the average causal effect of
CTRT, is denoted by θ 0 and defined in equation (1):
θ 0 1 1 1: ( | ) ( | ) ( | )= − = = = − =E Y Y S E Y S E Y St c t c . (1)
The short hand notation E(⋅ |S=1) denotes the mean in the population of all units who partici-
pate in training, denoted by S=1. If the objective is to draw inference only in a subpopulation
of S=1, defined by attributes contained in X, then this and the following expressions are
changed in an obvious way.
The question is how θ 0 can be identified from a large random sample of the population. The
problem is the term E Y Sc( | )=1 , because the pair ( , )y snc n = 1  is not observable. Much of the
literature on causal models in statistics and selectivity models in econometrics is devoted to
find reasonable (depending on the problem at hand) identifying assumptions to predict the
unobserved expected nontreatment outcomes of the treated population by using the observable
nontreatment outcomes of the untreated population ( , )y snc n = 0  in different ways.
If there is random assignment as in a suitably designed experiment, then the potential out-
comes would be independent from the assignment mechanism and E Y Sc( | )= =1
E Y Sc( | )= 0 . Then the untreated population could be used as the control group, which implies
that the expectations of their observable outcome would be equal to E Y Sc( | )=1 . Given a
large enough sample, the corresponding sample moments converge towards these population
moments under standard regularity conditions. However, as has been shown in the previous
section the assumption of random assignment is hardly satisfied. There appear to be several
variables which influence assignment as well as outcomes.
Using the law of iterated expectations to rewrite the crucial part of equation (1) as:
E Y S E E Y S X x Sc c( | ) [ ( | , )| ]= = = = =1 1 1 , (2)
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leads to another identifying restriction, called random assignment conditional on a covariate
(Rubin, 1977). The assumption is that the assignment is independent of the potential non-
treatment outcome conditional on the value of a covariate or attribute (CIA).9 If this assump-
tion is true, then E Y S X x E Y S X xc c( | , ) ( | , )= = = = =1 0 , and the quantity
E E Y S X x Sc[ ( | , )| ]= = =0 1  (= E Y Sc( | )=1 ) can be estimated in large samples using respec-
tive sample analogues. Note that the outer expectation operator is with respect to the distribu-
tion of X in the population of participants (S=1). The following sections show that this re-
striction is reasonable in the context under investigation. The important task will be to identify
and observe all variables that could be correlated with assignment and potential nontreatment
outcomes. This implies that there is no important variable left out which influences
nontreatment outcomes as well as assignment given a fixed value of the relevant attributes.10
There are different restrictions (e.g. Angrist and Imbens, 1991, Imbens and Angrist, 1994,
Heckman and Hotz, 1989, Heckman and Robb, 1985) available to solve the identification
problem, but this one appears to be the most fundamental in its close resemblance of the
experimental context, and, given the data available and the nature of the objective pursued
here, it is best suited for this context.
A brief comparison with standard econometric approaches is in order. When a prototypical
econometric approach is used, based on modelling particular moments of the potential out-
comes (e.g. Heckman and Hotz, 1989, Heckman and Robb, 1985, Maddala, 1983, and many
others), the same issues as mentioned above need to be addressed to make causal inference.
The wording will then invoke assumptions relating unobserved error terms to regressors. One
tends to speak about various sorts of exogeneity, functional forms, and distributional as-
sumptions, etc., to overcome selectivity and endogeneity problems. I think that this indirect
approach is more likely to hide important issues related to the causal or noncausal nature of
the intended inference, because it bases identifying assumptions on unobservables of the
assumed models. But only in rare cases has the researcher a precise idea what the error term
really embodies. Substantive relationships between important components of the analysis,
such as assignment mechanisms are easier to analyse, to communicate to non-econometri-
cians, and to discuss. This paper goes the latter route.11 Finally, it is also worth pointing out
that no assumptions about any constancy of the treatment effects for different individuals are
made here.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if CIA is valid, then the estimation problem simpli-
fies further. Let P(x) = P(S=1|X=x) denote the propensity score that is defined as the non-
trivial probability (0 < P(x) < 1) of being assigned to the treatment conditional on the possibly
                                                          
9
 It is important to note that this does not exclude the case of the treatment outcome being correlated with the
selection mechanism. In practice this may be quite important because having a higher treatment outcome as
some somebody who has the same nontreatment outcome may an (partially) efficient and often used selection
rule.
10 In the language of regression-type approaches such a variable would lead to simultaneity bias.
11
 See also Angrist (1995) for a discussion of model-based versus nonparametric evaluation in econometrics.
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high dimensional vector of characteristics x. Furthermore, let b(x) be a function of attributes
such that P[S=1|b(x)] = P(x), or in their words, the balancing score b(x) is at least as ’fine’ as
the propensity score. Their most important result is that if the potential outcomes are inde-
pendent of the assignment mechanism conditional on X=x, then they are also independent of
the assignment mechanism conditional on b(X)=b(x). Obviously, this result applies also to the
case with only the nontreatment outcome being independent of S, hence:
E Y S b X b x E Y S b X b xc c[ | , ( ) ( )] [ | , ( ) ( )]= = = = =1 0 . (3)
Hence, E Y S E E Y S b X b x Sc c( | ) { [ | , ( ) ( )]| }= = = = =1 0 1  can be used for estimation. The ma-
jor advantage of this property is the reduction of the dimension of the (nonparametric) esti-
mation problem. The disadvantage is that the probability of assignment - and consequently
any balancing scores that reduce the dimension of the estimation problem - is unknown to the
researcher and has to be estimated. However, this estimation may lead to a better understand-
ing of the assignment process itself. Details of this estimation are relegated to Section 4.2.2.
That section will also discuss a particular form of a balancing score ’finer’ than the propensity
score that has been introduced by Lechner (1995) and is especially useful for the specific
problems encountered in this evaluation studies.
4.2 Estimation of the propensity score
4.2.1 Variables potentially influencing the training decision and outcomes
Variables that might influence the decision to participate in CTRT as well as future potential
outcomes should be included in the conditioning set X and, therefore, in the propensity score
to avoid biased estimates of the causal effects. Variables only influencing the participation
decision may also be included to increase efficiency. To judge what variables this might be, it
is necessary to have a definition of the potential outcomes. Typical outcomes considered are
gross monthly earnings, employment status, expected unemployment and expected changes in
job positions in the next two years. Two concepts of timing are used for these outcomes,
specifying either a date or a specific time span after the completion of the course (see Section
4.4.1 for details).
In the following, I will identify reasons for participation in CTRT by supposing that indi-
viduals maximise future utility, or more precisely, the difference between the present values of
future earnings streams for both states. It seems plausible that at least factors influencing both
earnings and participation in CTRT can be identified in this fashion. It is not necessary to
develop any formal behavioural model in any detail. Considering the broad building blocks of
such a model is sufficient to identify potentially important attributes.12 In principle one would
                                                          
12 For an introduction in this field of labour economics the interested reader is referred to any modern text book,
such as Ehrenberg and Smith (1994).
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like to condition directly on these expected earnings (utility) streams, but since they are
unobserved, they have to be decomposed into the cost of CTRT and the additional returns of
CTRT. These factors have to be uncovered, because they are potentially important determi-
nants of the training decision.13 Although approval of the labour office is always necessary for
CTRT participation, it is important to note that the decision for CTRT participation has nev-
ertheless two dimensions: (i) the individual may push the labour office to allow him to par-
ticipate in the subsidised CTRT (getting this approval was easy until 1993), or (ii) the labour
office may push unemployed or STW individuals to participate in CTRT by threatening to
reduce unemployment or STW benefits. Therefore, I will start with discussing reason for (i)
from the point of view of the individual, and then for (ii) from the point of view of the labour
office.
There are at least two hypotheses why earnings with CTRT should be higher than without it,
everything else being equal. First of all, the additional human capital should increase indi-
vidual productivity and, therefore, workers should be able to obtain higher wages. Secondly,
CTRT can act as a signalling device for an employer who has incomplete information on the
worker’s productivity. Participation in CTRT might signal in particular higher motivation, and
the successful completion of longer CTRT courses may also signal higher ability (or reverse,
if there is stigma associated with CTRT!), and hence the employer may be prepared to com-
pensate for the expected higher productivity. In the first case the additional human capital will
yield returns - ignoring effects on pensions - until retirement, or until it is depreciated. There-
fore, age should not increase the participation probability, but should most likely decrease it.
The magnitude of the effect of age under the signalling hypotheses depends crucially on the
ability of the employer to learn quickly the true productivity of the worker, because sending
the ’wrong’ signal will only gain a temporary advantage until the employer understands their
true productivity. However, by getting employed due to a too positive signal, they may still
obtain additional experience that may increase their earnings as well as employment prospects
until retirement. This implies again a negative impact of age on CTRT participation (in case
of a negative expected signal CTRT participation will not occur). Another factor is how the
individual subjectively estimates the own future earnings streams. For this analysis it is not so
important to formulate the exact type of expectation formation as long as it is known what
kind of subjective expectations about the own labour market prospects the individual holds.
This information is available on a yearly basis on the GSOEP.
It is useful to divide the potential costs of CTRT for the individual in two broad groups: direct
costs and indirect or opportunity costs. Almost all the potential direct costs are beared by the
labour office. The labour office tends to give subsidies to individuals with low nontraining
                                                          
13 Note that for these considerations, it does not matter how the labour market really works, but how the
individual (and/or the labour office) believes it to work when deciding to participate in CTRT. There might be
substantial differences between actual and expected outcomes, when considering that individuals are used to
the rules of the command type economy of the former GDR. Furthermore, the high speed of changes after
unification makes correct predictions difficult.
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labour market prospects, as estimated by the labour office and high CTRT prospects. Oppor-
tunity costs basically consist of lost earnings and / or leisure. Since the marginal utility of lei-
sure should be lower during non-full-time work (a larger amount is available), the actual la-
bour market status can be an important factor of its own. It may also differ across individuals
according to tastes, as well as other socioeconomic factors such as marital status, or the per-
ceived actual (present) utility of time spent in training.
The above analysis has identified age, expected labour market prospects, actual employment
status, and other socioeconomic characteristics as major factors that could potentially influ-
ence the employment decision. Before going in more details about the groups of variables
used in the empirical analysis, I will discuss more fundamental issues concerning the admis-
sibility of variables in the conditioning set. Additionally, I will state two assumptions that are
very important in that respect for the particular situation in East Germany after unification,
because they make CIA a powerful and justifiable assumption in this context.
The first hypothesis is that the complete switch from a centrally planned economy to a market
economy in mid 1990, accompanied by a completely new incentive system, invalidates any
long term plans that connect past employment behaviour to CTRT participation. It was gen-
erally impossible for East German workers to predict the impact and timing of the system
change. Even when it was partly correctly foreseen, it was generally impossible to adjust be-
haviour adequately in the old system. This assumption, which seems to be highly realistic,
allows me to use all pre-unification variables as attributes.
An additional assumption will be invoked that is related to the condition of the labour market
in the rapidly contracting East German post-unification economy. Figure 1 shows that the la-
bour market is characterised by rapidly and continuously rising unemployment as well as
declining full-time employment. Furthermore, only about 10% of those working full-time in
mid 1990 were sure that they might not lose their job within the next two years. I assume that
no individual - having only slim chances of getting rehired once being unemployed - will vol-
untarily give up employment to get easier access to training funds (this may not even be nec-
essary before 1993, given the official guidelines for obtaining assistance from the labour of-
fice). This assumption allows me to consider monthly pre-training information on full-time
employment, involuntary short-time work and unemployment, etc. as attributes.
The groups of variables that are used in the empirical analysis to approximate and describe the
above-mentioned four broad categories of determining factors are age, sex, marital status, edu-
cational degrees as well as regional indicators. Features of the pre-unification position in the
labour market are captured by many indicators including wages, profession, job position,
employer characteristics such as firm size or industrial sector, among others. Individual future
expectations are described by individual pre-unification predictions about what might happen
in the next two years regarding job security, a change in the job position or profession, and a
subjective conjecture whether it would be easy to find a new job or not. Details of the particu-
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lar variables, mostly indicators, as well as their means and standard errors in the treatment and
control group are contained in Table A.1 of Appendix A. Furthermore, monthly employment
status information, as mentioned before, is available from July 1989 to December 1993.
Having discussed potentially important factors and variables available for the empirical
analysis, the question is whether some important groups of variables might be missing. One
such group can be described as motivation, ability and social contacts. I approximate these
kind of attributes by the subjective desirability of selected attitudes in society in 1990, such as
’performing own duties’, ’achievements at work’, and ’increasing own wealth’, together with the
accomplishment of voluntary services in social organisations and memberships in unions and
professional associations before unification, as well as schooling degrees and professional
achievements. Additionally, there are variables indicating that the individual is not enjoying
the job, that high income is very important for the subjective well-being, that the individual is
very confused by the new circumstances, and optimistic and pessimistic views of general
future developments. Another issue is the discount rate implicitly used to calculate present
values of future earnings streams. I assume that controlling for factors that have already been
decided by using the individual discount rate, such as schooling and professional education,
will be sufficient. Other issues concern possible restrictions of the maximisation problem such
as a limited supply of CTRT. Supply information is available, however it is aggregated either
within states (6) or in four groups defined by the number of inhabitants of cities and villages. I
conclude that, although some doubts could be raised, it seems safe to assume that these
missing factors (conditional on all the other observable variables) play only a minor role.
Finally, empirical papers analysing training programs in the US point to the importance of
transitory shocks before training, partly because of individual decision, partly because of the
policy of the program administrators. Card and Sullivan (1988) find a decline in employment
probabilities before training. Here, the monthly employment status data should take care of
that problem. Ashenfelter (1978) and Ashenfelter and Card (1985) observe a decline in earn-
ings prior to training, but it has been shown in the previous section that, there is no evidence
of this phenomenon in the sample used here.
4.2.2 Econometric considerations and first results for CTRT participation
The estimation of the propensity score is not straightforward, because there are potentially
important variables - monthly pre-training employment status and yearly pre-training self-
employment for example - that are related to the distance (months or years) to the beginning
of CTRT. Since these dates differ across CTRT participants, they are not clearly defined for
the control group. An approximation, which might look appealing at first sight, is to choose an
arbitrary date for the controls and compute the value of these variables regarding this date.
However, having the same date for all controls and different dates for the CTRT participants
leads to a dependence of this variable on CTRT participation, the dependent variable. This
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dependence is aggravated by the rapidly changing labour market conditions. Therefore, such a
variable cannot be considered exogenous. Consequently, I have to use a particular form of a
balancing score that is different from the propensity score for the conditioning.
Partition the vector of observed attributes in two groups such that X V M= ( , ) , and suppose
that P S X x( | )= = =1  P x( ) =  P V f M U V v M m[ ( , ) | , ]β 0 0+ > = = . U denotes some attrib-
utes - not included in X - that are independent of the potential outcomes, but influence CTRT
participation. V contains pre-unification as well as time invariant attributes. β 0 is a fixed
parameter vector. M denotes time variant pre-training variables. If the potential outcomes are
independent of S conditional on P(X) = P x( ) , then it is also true that they are independent of S
conditional on (V vβ β0 0= , M m= ), because ( , )v mβ 0  is a balancing score. Note that the use
of vβ 0  instead of v can still lead to a dramatic reduction of the dimension of the conditioning
set. The rest of this section discusses consistent estimation of v n Nnβ 0 1, ,..., ,=  up to scale
(and a constant that does not vary in the population).
In the following I estimate a binary probit model by maximum likelihood. The basic condition
for the consistent estimation of the linear index up to scale is that the conditional expectation
of the dependent variable is correctly specified:
P S V v v n Nn n( | ) ( ), ,..., .= = = =1 10 0 0β β βΦ (4)
Φ( )vnβ 0  denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
evaluated at vnβ 0 . The first of two sufficient conditions for equation (4) to hold is that the
propensity score has the additive form P x( ) =  P V f M U V v M m[ ( , ) | , ]β 0 0+ > = = . This
assumption is not so restrictive, because V may contain flexible functional forms for the at-
tributes, such as polynomials or interaction terms. The crucial assumption is that:
[ ( , )|[ ] ~ ( , ).f M U V v Nβ β0 0 0 1= (5)
N ( , )0 1  denotes the normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. Neither the assumption of
mean zero nor of unit variance is a problem, because required identification is only up to scale
and location. The crucial assumptions are normality and mutual independence of f(M,U) and
Vβ 0 . These assumptions are tested with specification tests. See Appendix C for details.
Although all detailed results of the probit estimation and the specification tests are presented
in Appendix C, let me now briefly sketch the results. Living in East Berlin is a significantly
positive factor for CTRT participation compared to the other federal states. The situation in
East Berlin - now part of a single federal state with West Berlin - is quite different to the
situation in the rest of East Germany, because of the closeness of the already existing CTRT
supply and the functioning labour office bureaucracy in West Berlin. Furthermore, the skill
composition of the population differs from the rest of the country, because East Berlin was the
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capital and the administrative centre of the former GDR, although this effect should be largely
- but perhaps not totally - captured by the schooling variables. The result for these variables
suggest that higher schooling is associated with higher CTRT participation.
Women are more likely to participate in CTRT, which is not surprising because women expe-
rience far more unemployment than men during the post-unification period. However, this
effect is lower for women in high job positions and women with high tenure.
Individuals who already know in 1990 that they will lose there their job, as well as those who
expect redundancies in the firm are also more likely to be observed participating in CTRT.
Additionally, there appears to be significant heterogeneity across different professions / occu-
pations and industrial sectors. Finally, the negative coefficient of the variable that measures
that the individual expects a decline in the professional career appears to be counter-intuitive,
thereas the negative coefficient for individuals for whose income is very important for their
subjective well-being may be due to a lower unemployment probability for these well moti-
vated individuals.
Many other variables have been considered as well, but none of them appeared to be missing
in the partial propensity score (see Tables A.1 and C.1 for details). The specification test do
not provide any evidence against the chosen specification.
4.3 Nonparametric estimation of causal effects and matching
This section summarises the nonparametric methods used to estimate the causal effects of
CTRT as discussed by Lechner (1995). The reader is referred to that paper for more details on
the estimation methods.
The considerations in the previous sections suggest to estimate the causal effects by non-
parametric methods in order to avoid potential inconsistencies due to misspecification. To
ease notation assume that observations in the sample are ordered such that the first Nt obser-
vations receive CTRT, and the remaining (N-Nt) observations do not. The following non-
parametric regression estimator is an obvious choice:
  ( | )  [ ( )]θ N t c t n
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θ N  denotes the estimate of the causal effects that is averaged over the sample of the Nt-treated
observations only. 1
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∑  denotes a consistent estimate (Nt increasing) of
E Y Sc( | )=1 . This will be satisfied under standard conditions, if  [ ( )]g b xc n  is asymptotically
unbiased (N-Nt increasing) for E Y S b X b xc n[ | , ( ) ( )]= =0 . Nonparametric regression could be
used to provide such an estimate. However, it will be subsequently shown that the balancing
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score most useful in this particular evaluation study has necessarily a high dimension. Given
the size of the available sample, nonparametric regressions are subject to the typical curse of
dimensionallity.
For these reasons I use a simpler nonparametric approach that appeared in the statistic litera-
ture (e.g. Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1985a). The idea is to find for every treated observa-
tion a single control observation that is as close to it as possible in terms of a balancing score.
When an identical control observation is found, the estimation of the avergae causal effects is
unbiased.14 In cases of ’mismatches’, it is often plausible to assume that using local regressions
on these differences will remove the bias. Appendix B gives the exact matching protocol as
well as the mismatch adjustment procedures. Appendix D contains information about the
exact empirical implementation of the algorithm.
A basic requirement for a successful (i.e. bias removing) implementation of a matching algo-
rithm is a sufficiently large overlap between the distributions of the conditioning variables in
both subsamples. Figure 6 shows the overlap for a very important conditioning variable, v β .
Although the mass of the distribution of the controls is to the left of the treated, there is over-
lap for all of the treated distribution.
Figure 6: Distribution of v β  for CTRT and controls
v β
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Table 3 presents the marginal means in various control groups and the CTRT group for sev-
eral important variables. Additional descriptive statistics are given in Table D.1 and Figure
                                                          
14
 Compared to the nonparametric regression described above, there is an asymptotic efficiency loss, because
observation n ( n N t≤ ) and its closest neighbour in the control population - instead of possibly many close
neighbours - are used to compute  [ ( )]g b xc n .
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D.1 in Appendix D. A comparison of column (2), based on randomly matching controls to
CTRT observations, with column (5) exhibits the expected fact that the increased pre-training
unemployment rates are not observed in the control population as a whole. Even when the
matching is on the partial propensity score (col. 3), unemployment and full-time work rates
differ dramatically. This shows clearly that matching on the partial propensity score is insuf-
ficient and that the monthly information has to be taken into account (col. 4). The entries in
Table 4 show that the proposed matching algorithm removes almost all of the differences in
the employment status variables in the month / year before CTRT. Indeed, the figures in the
following section will show that over the whole pre-CTRT period the CTRT observations and
controls based on the matching algorithm underlying column (4) do not differ significantly.
However, the exception to the rule is the variable high job position and variables correlated
with it, such as schooling (see Table D.1). This points to a control pool that is not quite rich
enough to allow a perfect match, because there appears to be a insufficient number of highly
qualified unemployed individuals (given the other characteristics). Therefore, in the following
section, an econometric adjustment mechanism is proposed to control for these kinds of mis-
matches.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of selected variables of CTRT and control sample: different
matching algorithms (103 observations)
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A comparison of the differences in yearly and monthly measured variables such as unem-
ployment is worth a remark. The difference between these variables and the drastic increase of
unemployment for example in the months before CTRT (see Figure 3) emphasizes the point
that the monthly calendar constitutes a very valuable information.
It is noteworthy that in the first part of their paper Card and Sullivan (1988) choose a very
similar approach. They match treated and controls regarding their pre-training employment
history. Unfortunately, they are in a worse position, because their data is subject to potentially
considerable measurement error concerning these variables. Additionally, the variables are
only measured on a yearly basis, so that the employment status just prior to training is un-
known. Furthermore, they completely ignore the kind of variables that enter the partial pro-
pensity score in this analysis. Therefore, it is not surprising that they decide that this kind of
conditioning is insufficient to yield unbiased estimates and switch over to a model-based-ap-
proach.
4.4 Evaluation
4.4.1 Outcomes
This paper is particularly interested in the effects of CTRT on post-training changes in actual
and anticipated labour market status and prospects. It is due to the nature of the data and cir-
cumstances (German unification in 1990) that at the time this paper is written no long run ef-
fects of CTRT can possibly be discovered.
The following outcomes are measured on a monthly basis by way of the retrospective em-
ployment calendar: involuntary short-time work, registered as being unemployed, and full-
time employment. In addition, the latter two variables are also available for the date of the
yearly interview. Another variable capturing characteristics of the actual labour market status -
measured once a year - is gross monthly earnings. For those being employed, it is defined as
the gross monthly earnings in the month before the interview. For those not being employed,
either imputed unemployment benefits or social assistance - whichever is higher - or zeros are
used instead (see Appendix A for details). Labour market prospects are measured once a year
as individual expectations or worries. They include expectations whether one might lose one’s
job in the next two years, and whether one is very worried about the security of the current
job.15 Additionally, there is information whether individuals expect an improvement or a
worsening of the current job (career) position.16 It is important to note for the discussion in the
following subsection that, except for the earnings variable, all outcome variables are coded as
binary indicators.
                                                          
15 For non-employed individuals these variables are coded as being very worried and as "expecting unem-
ployment".
16 For non-employed individuals these variables are coded as "expecting no improvement and no worsening".
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Finally, there is the issue of comparing outcomes for individuals participating in courses with
different end dates. Here, two concepts of comparison are applied. They consist either in
specifying a date or a specific time span (months or intervals of 0-1, 1-2, 2-3 years for yearly
information) after the completion of CTRT. Note that the number of observations available
for the evaluations decreases with the length of the time span considered.
4.4.2 Econometric issues
Define the differences in matched pairs in the sample, which consists of independently drawn
observations, as  ∆y y yn n
t
j
c
= − , ∆b xn( ) =  b x b xnt jc( ) ( )− , n N t=1,..., , where y jc  and x jc  de-
note values of an observation from the pool of individuals not participating in CTRT
(controls) that is matched to the treated (CTRT) observation n. The estimate of the average
causal effect and the respective standard error are computed as:

, (  ) ( )θ θ
N t n
n
N
N t y yt
t
t t cN
y Var
N
S S= = +
=
∑1 1
1
2 2∆ . (7)
Syt
2
 and Syc
2
 denote the square of the empirical deviation of Y in the CTRT sample and in the
sample matched to the CTRT-sample, respectively.17 As mentioned in the previous section,
when a perfect match is achieved, implying that ∆b xn( ) = 0 , n N t=1,..., , these estimates are
unbiased (cf. Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). When the sample is large enough the normal dis-
tribution can be used to perform tests and compute confidence intervals.
Equation (7) gives the principle nonparametric estimate of the causal effect to be refined in
the following in order to take account of time before and after CTRT. Denote by N tτ ,
{ }τ ∈ − − −..., , , , , , ,...3 2 11 2 3  the number of pairs observed at any distance to CTRT. Let ιτ ( )n  =
1 if observation n  is observed at distance τ . The observability of an observation in a particu-
lar distance depends only on the ending dates of CTRT (see Appendix A). In the following I
will assume that they are independent random variables.18 Therefore, the refined estimators
based on the distance as opposed to the date concept of time are defined as:
 ( )
,
θ ι
τ
τ
τ τN t n
n
N
t
t
N
n y=
=
∑1
1
∆ ,                         τ ∈ − − −{..., , , , , , ,...}3 2 11 2 3 ; (8)
                                                          
17 The variance estimate exploits the fact that the matching algorithm given in Appendix C.1 never chooses an
observation twice.
18
 Two checks are performed with respect to this assumption. First of all, the end dates (months) are regressed on
(1,p(v),p(v)2,p(v)3,m). None of the variables, except the constant, is significant, and the adjusted R2 is 0.1
( N t
−1 =103). Secondly, the sample is split according to different end dates, but the qualitative results do not
change at all. Therefore, there is no evidence from the data that the independence assumption (typically used
in unbalanced panels) is suspect.
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The variances are computed appropriately. When τ  is negative, then θ
τN
t  denotes the mis-
match in period τ  before CTRT, otherwise it denotes the effect of training in period τ  after
CTRT. θ N
T
T
t  indicates the accumulated effect T periods after CTRT. These effects are also
computed for subpopulations defined by attributes or training characteristics. No assumption
is necessary regarding whether or not the treatment effects may differ across the population. It
should also be remarked that whenever regression-type adjustments are used for different
dates (time spans) for the same outcome variable (see Appendix B for details), no cross-
period-coefficient restrictions are assumed to hold, but the estimations are performed for each
date or time span separately. Finally, for the yearly variables all means, variances and regres-
sions are also computed using the appropriate panel weights. Since there are only minor dif-
ferences among weighted and unweighted estimates, the former are not computed for the
monthly data.
4.4.3 Results
The results of the evaluations are given in following Figures 7 to 10, in Table 4 as well as in
Appendix E. Using eq. (8) for the figures and eq. (9) for Table 4 to estimate the causal effects
of CTRT, they show the differences between the control and the CTRT group for specific time
spans before and after the training for a selected group of outcome variables (multiplied by
100 for outcomes that are indicators).19 For variables measured by the monthly calendar the
distance is expressed in months, for those measured only for the particular month of the yearly
interview, the distance is expressed in years.20 The figures cover up to 18 months or up to 3
’years’ before the training and up to 27 months or 3 ’years’ after CTRT. They display the mean
effect (solid line; + for the mismatch corrected estimate) and its 95% pointwise confidence
interval based on the normal approximation (dashed line; ,  for the mismatch corrected es-
timates). The number of observations available to compute the respective statistics decrease
the longer the distance to the incidence of CTRT is (see Table 4 for the remaining number of
observations). The implications of this are that the variance increases. This is reflected in the
widening of the confidence intervals. However, the accuracy of the estimated intervals itself
may deteriorate, because the normal distribution may be not a very good approximation of the
sample distribution when the sample gets too small. Additionally, a mismatch correction may
be impossible or very imprecise, because there may be too few observations to identify and
                                                          
19 The results for those outcomes that are mentioned in Section 4.4.1, but do not appear here, are not
qualitatively different from the ones presented. Therefore, they are either relegated to Appendix E or omitted
for the sake of brevity.
20 The time span denoted as the first year is actually the time after the end of CTRT and the next interview.
Therefore, this time span may vary among individuals. The monthly data starts in July 1989 and ends in
December 1993, whereas the yearly data ranges from mid 1990 to early 1994.
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estimate the parameters of the ordered probit model.21 Hence, the results on the very right side
of tables have be interpreted with care.
Figures 7 and 8 present the result of the evaluations for the monthly outcome variables un-
employment and full-time employment.22 The part left to the 0 vertical mark allows a judge-
ment about the quality of the matches concerning the particular variable.23
Figure 7: Difference of unemployment rates in %-points
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As already noted in the discussion of match quality, there is small excess unemployment just
prior to the beginning of the course, that is however not at all significantly different from zero.
Figure 7 shows that the immediate effect of CTRT is additional unemployment in the months
following the end of CTRT. After a few months these effects disappear. Indeed Table 4 shows
the total effects after 9 months cannot be distinguished from zero. At first sight this seems
surprising, because Table 2 shows that the unemployment rate of CTRT participants is indeed
falling rapidly during the first 12 months after CTRT.
However, there seems to be a simple explanation for this effect. Remember that more than
50% of CTRT participants are unemployed before CTRT. For an unemployed person the im-
mediate effect of (full-time) CTRT is that during CTRT his or her search efforts will be re-
duced (mean duration is 12 months!) compared to the controls. The results suggest that if
                                                          
21 All computations based on less than 5 observations are suppressed.
22 Unemployment here indicates that the individual has registered for unemployment. There is another monthly
indicating the receipt of unemployment benefits ("Geld" or "Hilfe"). The results are almost exactly the same
when using this second measurement of unemployment.
23 Testing whether these lines deviate significantly from zero is in the same spirit as the tests suggested by
Rosenbaum (1984) to use overidentifying restrictions to try to invalidate CIA. The pre-CTRT outcomes here
are denoted as unaffected outcomes in his terminology.
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there is a positive effect of CTRT it is not large enough to compensate for this initial negative
outcome.
Table 4: Average effects in terms of additional months in particular employment state
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These general findings are confirmed by considering either STW and unemployment together
or by considering full-time employment the respective labour market outcome. Although for
the later the result is less precise in a statistical sense; the significance of it at the 95% level
depends on the method used. However, the mean shows exactly the same shape that is of
course inverted compared to Figure 7. Considering only a sample of individuals who are either
unemployed or on STW before CTRT sharpens these results (see Figures E.1 and E.2 of
Appendix E).
Figure 8: Difference of full time employment rates in %-points
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Figures 9 and 10 feature outcome variables that are only measured once a year, such as gross
monthly earnings and expected improvement of the professional career in the next two years.
There are no significant differences for the pre-training outcomes in both cases. For the earn-
ings variable presented in Figure 9 there does not appear to be an effect of training either. This
remains true when nonemployment earnings is coded differently (see Figure E.3 in Appendix
E) or when other functional forms such as log´s are used. Note however, that the estimated
earnings effects are mainly driven by the estimated full-employment probabilities. Estimation
of causal effects conditional on full-employment is complicated, because post-training full-
employed individuals are not a random sample from the treated / control population. Ad-
dressing the additional selection issues is beyond the scope of this paper. Another issue with
respect to problems of estimating earnings effects has already been noted by Ashenfelter
(1978): The returns-to-schooling literature typically suggests that one year of schooling has an
effect of less than 10% of additional earnings capacity. Since the duration of training courses
is typically much less than a year, and since earnings variable typically exhibit a large
variance, it will be very difficult to detect the comparatively small earnings effects expected a
priori. This view is confirmed by the large confidence intervals appearing in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Difference of gross earnings (in 1993 DM)
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Figure 10 reveals a potential shortcoming of this study: Individuals do think that CTRT will
improve their career prospective in the next two years. Since they CTRT participants expect to
improve their situation even in the two years after year two, and since they have already made
up the initial loss during CTRT, it might be that they will overtake the controls outside the
sample period. Unfortunately, from the data at hand it is impossible to decide whether this
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variable really contains information about future realisation of labour market outcome, or
whether this is just wishful thinking of CTRT participants.
Figure 10: Differences in expected improvements in the professional career in the next two
years in %-points
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These results are in contrast to more positive results obtained in a recent study by Fitzenberger
and Prey (1995). However, they use a different data set and model the joint stochastic proc-
esses of selection, panel attrition and outcomes using joint normality. With a similar data and
a similar estimation and identifying strategy than this paper, Lechner (1995a) arrives at com-
parable results in finding no clear-cut positive effects of off-the job training. However, both
studies analyse different kinds of training, for example by including training spells not funded
by the BA. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics for the kind of training analysed in these
papers clearly indicate that the results are very difficult to compare to the results of this paper
that exclusively focuses on longer training spells funded by the BA.
4.4.4 Sensitivity
Additionally to the already mentioned use of different functional forms as well as a different
way of computing non-employment earnings, the sensitivities of the results are checked in
several other directions.
The perspective of time is changed: instead of considering the distance from a point in calen-
dar time to the beginning or end of CTRT, the pre- and post CTRT outcome are compared and
averaged for the same months / years in calendar time. Two examples for these sorts of results
that do not lead to different conclusions are given in Figures E.6 and E.7 of Appendix E.
32
To check whether there might be differences of the average treatment effects in specific sub-
groups the sample is divided according to gender, job position, professional degree, age and
pre-training employment status. No significant differences appear.
To check the results for sensitivity with respect to the definition of CTRT, the courses used in
the estimation are split in several subsamples according to whether: (i) they began not earlier
than January 1991 ( N t
−1  = 88), (ii) they began not later than December 1991 ( N t−1  =57), (iii)
they ended not later than June 1993 ( N t
−1  = 85), (iv) they ended not later than December 1992
( N t
−1  = 59), (v) they have a minimum duration of two months ( N t−1  = 98), (vi) they have a
minimum duration of six months ( N t
−1  = 76), (vii) they have a minimum duration of two
months and a maximum duration of 18 months ( N t
−1  = 79), and (viii) there are no multiple
spells ( N t
−1  = 92). As a final sensitivity check I also considered a control and treatment group
that did not participate in any other form of training ( N t
−1  = 89). None of the subsamples
reveals a substantial difference compared to the results presented above.
In conclusion the sensitivity analysis reveals a remarkable stability of the results.
5 Conclusion
The general findings of the paper suggest that there are no positive earnings and employment
effects of public sector sponsored continuous vocational training and retraining (CTRT) in the
short-run. Regarding the risk of unemployment there are indeed negative effects of CTRT
directly after training ends. However, these negative effects are compensated over the first
year after training. It is open question whether the lack of a positive effect is due to a bad sig-
nal (i.e. lack of skills) participants send to prospective employers, or whether it is due a lack
of quality in a narrow sense. Nevertheless, the results in this paper suggest that CTRT after
unification was very much a waste of resources, providing quantity without sufficient quality
(or a sufficiently positive signal). The quality problem has been realised by the labour office,
which subsequently tried to improve quality and changed the selection process to include a
higher share of individuals previously unemployed in CTRT.
This negative picture may be an exaggeration of the situation for several reasons: Firstly,
money spent for CTRT in the first two to three years may be seen as investments in the East
German training infrastructure, that had to be build from scratch. In this sense future CTRT
might still yield some returns on these early investments. Secondly, the massive use of CTRT
achieved a significant reduction of the official unemployment rate. This was politically de-
sired, and hence it might be seen as an achievement per se. Finally, there is some evidence
that trainees expect positive returns over a longer time horizon. Since this horizon is beyond
the sampling period available for this study, it is impossible to learn from the data whether
these expectations are correct or not. If these expectations materialise, then future evaluations
will find positive effects of training.
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Although the data and the suggested nonparametric estimation strategy appeared to be well
suited for the problem at hand, the small sample remains a problem. It is mainly reflected in
comparatively large standard errors when considering medium or long term effects. Therefore,
interesting future research should investigate these effects over a longer period. Additionally,
one might investigate jointly the effects of different types of training, such as on-the-job train-
ing versus off-the-job training, or publicly funded versus privately funded training. Likewise,
it will be an issue whether the quality of the publicly funded training did really improve after
1992, as claimed by official sources.
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Appendix A:  Data
This appendix briefly explains the coding of the start, duration, and end date of CTRT
courses. It also contains a histogram for the distribution of start dates and the ending dates in
Figures A.1 and A.2 as well as the pdf and cdf of durations in Figure A.3 and A.4. Further-
more, the exact definition of the earnings variables used in the evaluations are given. Finally,
Table A.1 and Figures A.5 and A.6 show descriptive statistics for all variables used in the es-
timation.
Figure A.1: Distribution of CTRT start dates
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Figure A.2: Distribution of CTRT end dates
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There are several cases with multiple spells of training (10%). In these cases single durations
of the spells are added, and Figure A.1 shows the beginning date of the first spell, and Figure
A.2 shows the end date of the last spell. Censored refers to the sample that includes spells not
completed by Dec. 1993, respectively Dec. 1992 in cases when the data for 1993 was not
available. Furthermore, a few spells are included that begin in early 1993 (Jan. 6 cases, Feb. 1
case, March 2 cases). It must be that the cases beginning in January 1993 have been approved
in 1992 (and this seems to be a reasonable assumption for the 3 other cases as well). Hence,
they are subject to the same rules as the other CTRT observations. Additionally, the first ma-
jor tightening of rules in 1993 happened in early May (see BA 1993b).
The sample given in the following table is the sample used for the estimation of the partial
propensity score. For the CTRT sample this means that observations with uncomplete training
spells are not deleted. In the control sample several observations have been deleted related to
specific attributes for which no CTRT observation is observed. For those variables the sample
mean in the control sample before deleting them is given in brackets.
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Figure A.3: Distribution of CTRT durations
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Figure A.4: Empirical distribution functions
for durations of training
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Gross monthly earnings is only measured for those employed. Due to the selection criteria that
creates a sample of full-time employees in mid 1990 it is not a problem for 1990, but only for
the following years. For those unemployed unemployment benefits are computed using 67%
of the last gross earnings, which should be a conservative estimate of the value of the gross
equivalent for the actual net payment. However, it is assumed that all those unemployed
remain eligible for unemployment benefits as opposed to unemployment assistance until 1993.
This assumption is plausible, because of the special regulations for East Germans after
unification (ratios of people receiving unemployment assistance relative to those receiving
assistance or benefits: 1991: 3%, 1992: 8%, 1993: 14%; Statistisches Bundesamt, 1994, Table
6.15.4). It is assumed that these benefits increase yearly in line with the price index for private
consumption.24 After performing these imputations, it is ensured that earnings levels are not
below average social assistance levels (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung,
1994, Table 8.16A). Finally, all earnings variables are converted to 1993 DM by using the pri-
vate consumption price index for East Germany (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soz-
ialordnung, 1994, Table 6.9, and Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft, 1994, Table 8). A second
measure of earnings is computed by stipulating zero earnings for those unemployed. This sec-
ond measure of earnings is motivated by the idea that earnings are in some sense a measure of
individual productivity.
                                                          
24 It would be preferable to use the wage deflator, but the time series are not complete.
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Figure A.5: Share of full-time employed
CTRT participants in %
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Figure A.6: Share of unemployed or STW
CTRT participants in %
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Appendix B: Econometrics
B.1 Matching protocol
This section gives the details of the matching protocol used for the final evaluations.
Step 1: Split observations in two exclusive pools according to whether they participated in
CTRT (T-pool) or not (C-pool).
Step 2: Draw randomly an observation in T-pool (denoted by n) and remove from T-pool.
Step 3: Define calliper of partial propensity score for observation n in terms of the predicted
index vn β  and its conditional variance Var V V vn(  | )β = . The latter is derived from
Var(  )β  by the delta method.
Step 4: Find observations in C-pool (denoted by j) obeying v j β∈ [  (  )]v c Var vn nβ β± . The
constant c is chosen such that the interval is identical to a 95% confidence interval
around vn β .
Step 5: (a) If there is only one or no observation in this interval: find observation j in C-pool
that is closest to observation n, such that it minimises (   )v vj nβ β− 2 .
(b) If there are two or more observations in this set generated by Step 4: Take these
controls and compute the variables m in relation to the start date of observation n. De-
note these and perhaps other variables already included in V as ~mj  and ~mn , respec-
tively. Define a distance between each control j and n as d j n( , ) =
(  , ~ ) (  , ~ )v m v mj j n nβ β′− ′ . Choose control j such that it has the smallest Mahalanobis
distance m j n d j n Wd j n( , ) ( , ) ( , )= ′  within the calliper. W denotes the inverse of the
estimated variance of (  , ~)v mβ ′  in the C-pool.
Step 6: Remove j from C-pool.
Step 7: If there are any observations in the T-pool left, start again with step 2.
This matching protocol is close to the one proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985a) and
Rubin (1991). They find that this kind of protocol produces the best results in terms of ’match
quality’ (reduction of bias). The difference is that instead of using a fixed calliper-width for all
observations, the widths are allowed to vary individually with the precision of the estimates of
a monotone function of the partial propensity score (step 4). The widths are large, because
matching is not only on the partial propensity score and its components, but also on additional
variables. The unbounded linear index vn β  is used instead of the bounded partial propensity
score Φ(  )vnβ . Matching on the latter with this kind of symmetric metric leads to an undesir-
able asymmetry when Φ(  )vnβ  is close to 0 and 1, depending on which side the control j is.
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Furthermore, defining the balancing score in terms of (  , ~ )v mj jβ  has also the advantage of
making it easier to state under what conditions this type of condition has the same properties
as conditioning on the (unknown and not estimable) propensity score itself.
B.2 Correction for mismatches
This appendix briefly gives the method used to correct for any mismatch remaining after using
the algorithm described in section B.1 of this appendix. Denote the difference of the potential
outcomes by ∆Y  = (Y Yt c− ). The realisations of the sample and the matching process gives
us pairs (∆ ∆y xn n, ), n N t≤ . Define the difference in terms balancing scores as
∆b x b x b xn n j( ) ( ) ( )= − . x j  denotes the value of x for observation j that is matched to obser-
vation n. Note that in general, equation (B.1) holds:
E y b x E E Y b X b x Sn n n[ | ( ) ] { [ | ( ) ( )]| }∆ ∆ ∆= = = = =0 1 0θ . (B.1)
However, ∆b xn( )  may not be exactly zero. In this case the exact type of the suggested
correction will depend on whether the outcome variables are continuous or discrete. In the
case of continuous variables it is reasonable to assume that the conditional expectation of the
dependent variable is linear in ∆b xn( ) , because matching has already removed almost (if N is
finite) all differences in the balancing scores, so that the ∆b xn( )  are local deviations:
E y b x n Nn n n n t[ | ( ) ] , .∆ ∆ = = + ≤η θ η λ0 (B.2)
Local smoothing using a linear conditional expectation is not very restrictive and standard
linear regression methods can be used to estimate the average treatment effect θ 0  by regress-
ing the differences in the balancing score and a constant on the differences in outcomes (cf.
Rubin, 1979).25
Suppose now that the outcome consists of only two values, say 0 and 1, hence the support of
∆Y  is the set {-1,0,1}. In this case, the treatment effect can be written as:
θ 0 1 1 1 1 1= = = = = − = − =E Y S P Y S P Y S( | ) ( | ) ( | )∆ ∆ ∆ (B.3)
A consistent estimate of the average treatment effect can be obtained by substituting sample
analogues for the population probabilities:
 { [ | ( ) ] [ | ( ) ]}θ
N t n n n n
n
N
t
t
N
P y b x P y b x= = = − = − =
=
∑1 1 0 1 0
1
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ (B.4)
                                                          
25 In the empirical evaluations standard errors are computed using a heteroscedasticity robust estimator. The
particular variant is labeled as HC2 by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p.554) and has good small sample
properties.
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Using a linear approximation for these differences of probabilities is not so attractive as be-
fore, except when ∆b xn( )  is very small. Therefore, I choose a more parsimonious specifica-
tion. In a first step a three-group-ordered probit model is estimated with ∆yn  as dependent
variable and ∆b xn( )  plus a constant as independent variables.26 The asymptotic covariance
matrix for the estimated coefficients of the ordered probit model are computed using the
combination of OPG and expected hessian. In the second step, the above probabilities are di-
rectly derived from this model and computed for the individual observations using the esti-
mated coefficients of the ordered probit model. Finally, the variance of θ N t  is derived from
the variance of the estimated coefficients of the ordered probit model by the use of the delta
method. Note that the functional form assumption for the conditional mean of ∆Y  is asymp-
totically unimportant as long as the differences in attributes ∆xn  disappear.
The same approaches as for the mismatch corrections are chosen to check whether the treat-
ment effects vary either with characteristics of the courses, such as its duration, or with
characteristics of the individuals participating in CTRT. Note that this procedure is not nested
in the previous one, because now the assumption that either the treatment effect is stable or
varies in a particularly specified way is indispensable. Therefore, splitting the samples in
subpopulations and performing estimations in these subpopulations that do not require such an
assumption is an attractive alternative for discrete attributes and continuous characteristics.
However, when the attributes and characteristics have too many different values some
modelling is required given the size of the sample used in this study. For more details see
Lechner (1995).
Appendix C: Estimation results for the partial propensity score
Table C.1 in this appendix presents the results of the probit estimation of the partial propen-
sity score as well as the results of the specification tests. 27 All variables that are not contained
in Table C.1, but described in Table A.1, as well as different functional forms for the continu-
ous variables, and interaction terms between Gender and variables related to job position and
education, are subjected to score tests against omitted variables. None of them appears to be
significantly missing at the 5% level. Most results are above the 10% level.
Conditional homoscedasticity (implied by independence) and normality are tested using con-
ventional specification tests (similar to Bera, Jarque, and Lee, 1984, Davidson and
MacKinnon, 1984, and Orme, 1988, 1990) described and applied in Blundell, Laisney, and
                                                          
26 One bound and the variance of the underlying linear models are normalized (see Maddala, 1983, for details on
the ordered probit model).
27 A table for the tests against missing variables is omitted for reasons of space. The results are available on
request from the author.
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Lechner (1993) and in Lechner (1995b).28 Furthermore, the consistency property of the speci-
fication tests, in particular of such omnibus tests like the information matrix test will eventu-
ally detect any other dependence of Vβ 0  and f(M,U).
Table C.1: Results of the estimation and the specification tests for the participation probit
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28 The use of semiparametric methods, such as SNP estimation suggested by Gabler, Laisney and Lechner (1993)
has been considered. However, it is not necessary, because the specification tests indicate no violation of the
distributional assumptions necessary for the probit model.
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The t-values and score test results against heteroscedasticity presented in Table C.1 are com-
puted using the GMM (or PML) formula given in White (1982).29 The information matrix
tests statistics are computed using the second version suggested in Orme (1988) that appeared
to have good small sample properties.30
The results of the specification does do not provide any evidence against the chosen specifi-
cation. First of all, the last two columns of Table C.1 do not contradict the assumption of
conditional homoscedasticity. Furthermore, the normality test as well as the information
matrix tests do not reject.
Appendix D: Implementation of the matching methods and
descriptive statistics for the match quality
In this appendix the implementation of the different matching algorithms are explained fur-
ther, and some descriptive statistics for the match quality are given.
When using the partial propensity score for matching note that conditioning is on vn β  instead
of vnβ 0 . The asymptotic standard error, computed using the delta method, of vn β  resulting
from the estimation of  β   can be considerable and ranges from 0.13 to 0.47 in the CTRT
sample, and from 0.17 to 0.48 in the control sample. The mean in the CTRT (control) sample
is 0.27 (0.26), the median 0.27 (0.26), and the empirical standard deviation 0.07 (0.06).
Therefore, it can be expected that by matching only approximately on vn β , but additionally
also on some important components of v directly, a better match could be obtained. The
details of the matching algorithm used are described in Appendix B.1. It follows Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1985a) suggestion of "matching within calipers of the propensity score" with the
exception that window sizes (caliper widths) depend explicitly on the precision of the estimate
vn
β . The more precise vn β  is estimated, the smaller is the width. The additional variables
used are gender, university, 12 and 8 years of schooling, women in highly qualified or man-
agement job positions (1990). Using these variables - a subset of those variables included in
vn  - separately is an additional safeguard against any impact due to inconsistent estimation of
the partial propensity score.
                                                          
29 Five versions are computed: based on the matrix of the outer product of the gradient (OPG) alone, on the
empirical hessian alone, on the expected (under the null) hessian alone, and on combining the hessian,
respectively the expected hessian (under the null), and the OPG. Previous Monte Carlo studies (e.g. Davidson
and MacKinnon, 1984, Lechner, 1991) as well as theoretical papers (e.g. Dagenais and Dufour, 1991) show
that tests based on the latter at least avoid some undesirable properties which can occur with other versions (a
brief survey of these issues is contained König and Lechner, 1994, see also Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993).
Therefore, the results given in Table 3 are computed using these estimates of the covariance matrix.
30 The first version is almost numerically identical. Only main-diagonal indicators refers to a version of the
information matrix test using as test indicators only the main diagonal of the difference between OPG matrix
and the matrix of the expected hessian.
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As has been argued in the main body of the paper conditioning on monthly employment in-
formation to capture the impact of temporary shocks could be important. Figure D.1 shows
indeed that including only v n β  in the balancing score is insufficient. The figure displays the
difference in the unemployment rate between CTRT and different control samples relative to
the number of months before CTRT. The two lines that are highest in the right hand part of
the plot are based on the matching method mentioned so far plus a random draw in the control
pool. 31 They are very similar and reveal unemployment rates that are up to 45%-points lower
than for the CTRT sample. Conditioning additionally on the yearly and monthly pre-training
employment information reduces the bias significantly. The additional variables used are ex-
pectation of losing own job in the next two years (yearly), expectation of a declining career in
the next two years (yearly), monthly wage / salary (yearly), training (unspecified, yearly), self-
employment (yearly), highly qualified or management job positions (yearly), unemployment
(monthly), STW (monthly), full-time work (monthly). Although there is still a small upward
bias, figures in the main body of the text show that it is not significantly different from zero.
Therefore, all the following evaluations are based on this matched sample.
Figure D.1: Difference of pre-training unemployment between CTRT and matched control
groups in %-points: a comparison of different matching algorithms
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Table D.1 gives additional descriptive statistics for control groups based on different or no
matching procedure and the CTRT group. The sample size used in the estimation of the coef-
ficients of the partial propensity score of 125 is now reduced to 103 because censored spells
                                                          
31 The different versions of the matching algorithms are obvious simplifications of the algorithm given in App.
B.1.
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and variables that have missing values in variables necessary for this step of the analysis are
deleted.
Table D.1: Descriptive statistics of selected variables (1990) of CTRT and control sample:
different matching algorithms
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Appendix E: More evaluation results
This appendix contains additional results for various outcome variables that have been omit-
ted from the main body of the paper.
Figure E.1: Unemployment: only CTRT
participants unemployed or STW
before CTRT
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Figure E.2: Full-time employment: only
CTRT participants unemployed or
STW before CTRT
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Figure E.3: Gross earnings (in 1993 DM)
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Figure E.4: Very worried about possibility of
future job loss (or unemployed)
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Figure E.5: Expected decline in the profes-
sional career in the next two years
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Figure E.6: Registered unemployment (date)
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Figure E.7: Full-time employment (date)
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Having discussed results concerning the distance in time to the beginning and ending of a
training course, I now turn to the second perspective and consider results for specific dates.
Figures E6 and E7 show the development of pre-training (lines) and post-training outcomes
(unconnected symbols) over time.32 Note that when moving from left to right the number of
observations is decreasing for pre-training outcomes and increasing for post-training out-
comes. However, the conclusions drawn above regarding matching quality and nonexisting
                                                          
32 Mismatch adjustment is not performed for these two figures.
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CTRT effects are adequate for this perspective as well. Since the perspective used above is
more informative concerning training outcomes, and because there are no qualitative differ-
ences, the results for the other variables are omitted.
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